OKC residents are demanding three things from City Council: don't renew the Flock contract. Remove the cameras. Don't sign with another ALPR vendor. On August 18, 2026, the Council renewed the contract anyway, adding only a narrow ban on sharing data with federal agencies. Flock keeps the cameras, the data, and its hold on both. More than 2,200 Oklahomans signed to end the contract, not regulate it. Three council members voted no: Cooper, Hamon, and Pennington. The contract says 90 cameras. The community map shows 299. Surveillance does not make our city safer - and we're done being asked to trust private companies that have been caught lying about what they collect.
It's not just license plate readers anymore. It's a surveillance platform now under federal constitutional challenge, run by a vendor with a documented pattern of lying to city councils. Seven concrete reasons it should concern every OKC resident.
In March 2026, OKCPD admitted in writing it had no access controls, no use policy, no audit procedures, and no discipline standards for Flock. Only after residents filled council chambers and filed records requests did the department start advertising a 30-day manual review plus a "continuous AI audit," the AI audit being Flock's own software auditing Flock's own system. Then a resident asked for the log that would prove it works, and the city denied it. Their only published ALPR policy (Manual §5-118) still covers vehicle-mounted readers, not Flock's static cameras. An audit no one is allowed to inspect is a press release, not oversight.
Oklahoma statute 47 O.S. §7-606.1 limits ALPR use to insurance enforcement. OKCPD uses Flock far beyond that. Their own Operations Manual states ALPR data "will not be shared as part of a law enforcement information database" - but Flock's entire business model is exactly that: 5,000+ agencies and 100,000+ cameras sharing data nationwide. On August 18, OKCPD confirmed 109 local agencies can already pull OKC's Flock data, and when Councilwoman Hamon asked for the list, Chief Bacy said, "No, ma'am."
Every photo from every camera leaves city limits and lands on Flock's private servers, beyond the reach of any public records request. The devices have numerous confirmed security vulnerabilities and can be compromised in 30 seconds. Independent researchers found at least 60 cameras streaming live to the open internet - including one pointed at a children's playground. No password. No encryption. Anyone with a search engine could watch.
Flock's newer Condor cameras use AI-powered pan, tilt, and zoom to automatically follow people - not vehicles. The contract says 90 city cameras, but the community map shows 299 in the OKC metro. Private businesses, parking lots, and HOAs feed data into the same Flock network. In Dunwoody, GA, Flock employees were caught accessing cameras inside a gym, including the pool, fitness studio, and a children's gymnastics room. And the 90 is a floor, not a cap: through Fusus, the Axon-owned real-time crime center OKCPD taps, the department already pulls in private and community cameras beyond its Flock poles. Removing the Flock poles alone would not close that pipe, which is why we also refuse any replacement vendor, Axon included.
It has already happened here. From December 2024 to April 2025, an OKCPD sergeant used police databases for personal use, surfaced by a resident's complaint and not by an audit, and drew a 3-day unpaid suspension and a year of probation. On August 18, Chief Bacy admitted the department has "had incidents with two employees." Elsewhere, officers have been charged with crimes for using Flock to stalk partners and exes. Tulsa PD logged protest-related searches. Texas deputies used it for an abortion investigation. Flock's own VP of Business Development searched a city's database 63 times without being a police officer. In San Francisco, outside agencies searched local data 1.6 million times without authorization. And when researchers reported all of this, Flock's CEO sent an email to police departments calling them "activists who want to defund the police."
Flock can activate new surveillance features - audio detection, video, AI capabilities - on existing cameras without council approval or public notice. In February 2026, they quietly rewrote their contract terms: deleting data ownership protections and adding a "perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide" data license that survives termination. They block web archiving so cities can't track changes. The August 2026 renewal changed only one enforceable term, a ban on sharing OKC's data with federal agencies. The retention cut, the keyword blocks, and the "regular audits" the city advertised are Flock settings and department policy, revocable without a vote. See what the amendment actually changed.
No effectiveness report has ever been published for OKC's system. A peer-reviewed evaluation of a major ALPR expansion in Atlantic City found no statistically significant reduction in violent crime. In San Jose, only 0.25% of 360 million captured images matched any law enforcement hotlist. The rest was just data on ordinary people going about their lives. Chief Bacy has credited Flock with roughly 1,280 stolen vehicles recovered, 210 missing persons found, and 60 murder cases aided, but the department confirmed in writing (OCPD-10088) that it keeps no records linking any Flock search to a case outcome. It cites results its own files cannot show.
OKC pays Flock $270,000 a year. Flock is valued at $8.4 billion. Camera leasing fees can't explain the gap - which means cities aren't the real customers. We are.
Who is actually paying for Flock? →“There is no transparency reporting or internal usage reporting in our policies, SOPs, directives, training or guidance materials.”- OKCPD Department Memorandum, March 10, 2026, on official letterhead in response to our records requests. The department has advertised an audit since. It still won't let the public see the log (OCPD-10716). Read it yourself.
We filed three requests to OKCPD and three to the City of Oklahoma City. Every finding below is sourced from official responses.
All three OKCPD requests came back with the same response: a link to the online Operations Manual. No Flock-specific documents, no contracts, no policies. The department that operates the system couldn't produce a single document governing its use.
Source: OCPD-2885, OCPD-2886, OCPD-2887-2026The City's response to our re-filed request included OKCPD's own internal memorandum - the document in which the department admitted, in writing, that as of March 2026 it had no access controls, no prohibited-use policies, no audit procedures, no discipline standards, and no transparency reporting for Flock.
Source: ORR-1095-2026, Department Memorandum OCPD-2885-2026Operations Manual §5-118, in the published 6th Edition (pp. 283-284), describes vehicle-mounted ALPR units operated by officers during shifts, not Flock's static, network-connected cameras. That edition also stated ALPR data would not be shared as part of a law enforcement information database. OKCPD quietly rewrote §5-118 in June 2026, softening that clause, and the paper trail behind the rewrite (OCPD-9710) came back with nothing new.
Source: OKCPD Operations Manual 6th Edition, pp. 283-284Flock's contract authorizes use for general "crime awareness, prevention, and prosecution." Oklahoma statute 47 O.S. §7-606.1 limits ALPR use to insurance enforcement. The gap between what's authorized and what's happening has never been publicly addressed.
Source: Master Agreement C241032 vs. 47 O.S. §7-606.1OKCPD admits training materials for Flock exist but withholds them as "law enforcement use only" - without citing any statutory exemption from the Oklahoma Open Records Act. If the training is above board, why can't the public see it?
Source: OCPD-2885-2026 Internal Memorandum, Item 2Round 1 was the receipts round. Round 2 was the audit round, and the first answers are back. OCPD-9710, the paper trail behind OKCPD's June 2026 rewrite of Section 5-118, was answered and produced nothing new. OCPD-10088, on stolen-vehicle case linkage, came back "not tracked": the department keeps no records tying Flock searches to outcomes. OCPD-10080, our request for the audit logs, was denied, and when a July 22 follow-up (OCPD-10716) asked for the Admin Console audit-log export instead, the city denied that too. An audit no one can inspect is a press release, not oversight. Every status is on the Records page.
See the responses →For the full national picture - business model, security failures, federal lawsuits, vendor conduct, and the broader coalition pushing back - read The Case →
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